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Abstract
Within California’s cap-and-trade program, forest offsets allow landowners to earn
carbon credits for protecting forests that sequester carbon and sell these credits to polluters that
can then emit one additional ton of carbon. The state’s top regulator, the California Air
Resources Board (CARB), is tasked with overseeing cap-and-trade and the forest offset system.
CARB is currently updating the state’s Climate Change Scoping Plan to set California on track to
achieve its 2030 climate goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 40% below 1990 levels.
CARB is approving forest offsets that overestimate emissions reductions, while allowing
companies to continue polluting in disadvantaged communities across the state. The forest offset
guidelines contain loopholes that allow project developers to maximize carbon credits by taking
advantage of statistical differences between regions, submitting hypothetical heavy logging
proposals for forests that were already protected, and contributing low amounts to destruction
insurance. Even a perfect forest offset system, devoid of these existing flaws, delivers net neutral
benefits to the climate because emissions produced are matched 1:1 with emissions reductions
through increased carbon sequestration in forests.
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I.

Introduction
Emissions trading policies such as cap-and-trade originated in 1976 when the US

Environmental Protection Agency prohibited new business in regions which did not meet air
quality standards under the Clean Air Act (Tietenberg, 2016). Policymakers looked to emissions
trading to address air quality concerns while furthering economic growth. New companies could
purchase emission reduction credits from existing companies in order to enter the marketplace,
which kept emissions at the same level while encouraging new business (Cushing et al., 2018).
Emissions trading was formalized in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which allowed countries to trade
emissions quotas according to their legally binding emissions targets (Tietenberg, 2016). The
United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and the first introduction of domestic emissions
trading was the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, developed by 10 Northeastern states in 2005
(Klinsky, 2012).
In 2006, the California Legislature passed AB 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act,
which set a cap on emissions statewide that decreases over time to secure emissions reductions.
The bill requires polluting companies to buy and trade permits to continue emitting carbon, with
the cap on total emissions across all companies decreasing 3-3.5% every year (Cushing et al.,
2018). Companies have four options to be compliant in this cap-and-trade system: upgrading
facilities to be more efficient, emitting less carbon, buying polluting permits from other
companies, or buying offset credits. Offsets are specific credits that polluters can purchase that
counteract or cancel out carbon emissions through carbon sequestration. Offsets could originally
cover up to 8% of the required emissions reductions by canceling out the emitted carbon, but
since 2020, companies can only offset 4% of their required reductions (Haya et al., 2020). The
original bill was only 13 pages long, leaving much of the cap-and-trade program to be designed
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and implemented by the California Air Resources Board (CARB), the state’s climate regulator
(Bigger, 2016). Cap-and-trade officially began in California on January 1, 2013.

Forest Offsets
Forest offsets are the most commonly used form of offset in California’s cap-and-trade
program, allowing a landowner to earn one carbon credit for every ton of carbon stored in their
trees that is above what other trees in the region store (Pontecorvo and Osaka, 2021).
Landowners can sell these credits to polluters in California with the plan that each ton of carbon
emitted as a result of the offset is balanced out by a ton of carbon stored in forests. There are
over $2 billion worth of offsets present in California’s cap-and-trade program, though offset
credits can be generated by projects anywhere in the continental United States or southern
Alaska (Badgley et al., 2021). In addition to maintaining forests that store higher-than-average
carbon for their area, project owners can eliminate logging or improve forest management
practices in order to earn carbon credits (Gifford, 2018).
The Conference of the Parties climate convention in Bali in 2007 first introduced forest
offsets in global policy discussions in the form of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation (REDD) programs (Gifford, 2020). They were introduced as a way for
developed countries to compensate developing countries for their forest management and carbon
sequestration, canceling out some of their industrial carbon emissions. Nevertheless, concerns
grew about the colonial implications of REDD programs in which investment in conservation
was based on continued and potentially increased fossil fuel emissions (Fletcher et al., 2016).
REDD was re-invented to remove the contentious international development components,
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resulting in a cap-and-trade program similar to California’s which relies on internal forest
projects for the generation of carbon credits.
Forest offset projects involve quantifying, calculating, and translating forest carbon
storage into a defined number of carbon credits that polluters can buy via the carbon market. The
system of forest offsets must delicately balance ensuring real emissions cuts and creating a viable
carbon market that can fund forest conservation and carbon sequestration (Song & Temple,
2021a). One challenge is that measuring ecosystem growth and carbon sequestration is a
subjective and varied calculation that is frequently over or underestimated (Gifford, 2020). There
is no easy template for how to design the core components of a cap-and-trade program, and
calculations of carbon storage that go above and beyond the status quo of historical forest
conservation are nearly impossible to measure objectively. Specific regulatory decisions by
CARB influence how many carbon credits a forest offset project will receive and can frequently
lead to either over or underestimation of carbon storage, which has real climate implications for
Californians.

History of Environmental Justice in California
Over 5.4 million Californians currently live within a mile of an oil or gas well, and about
4 million of them are people of color (Srebotnjak & Rotkin-Ellman, 2014). Oil drilling
operations in California are concentrated in Los Angeles and Kern Counties, and these
communities face adverse health impacts as a result of the elevated levels of air pollution. Of
those who live within a mile of a well, 1.8 million live in communities that face a
disproportionate amount of the state’s air pollution, and 92% of these heavily impacted
Californians are people of color (Srebotnjak and Rotkin-Ellman, 2014). Fracking and oil
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production is closely linked to negative health outcomes, such as cardiovascular diseases,
asthma, and cancer. In Kern County, where more than half of the residents are people of color,
lung cancer is the leading cause of death, and infant mortality and heart disease death rates are
higher than the state average (Gonzalez et al., 2022).
In the Yurok Tribe in Northern California, over 80% of community members live below
the poverty line (Kormann, 2018). After years of legal battles over land and water rights, the
tribe gained federal recognition in 1986 and the government granted them 5,000 acres of
land–1% of their historical land (Beck, 2021). The Yurok Tribe, along with seven other
Indigenous entities, participate in California’s offset program to invest in their communities and
purchase land back with the earnings from selling carbon credits (Kormann, 2018).
In 2012, Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 535, directing 25% of revenue from
cap-and-trade to projects that will benefit disadvantaged communities (Bigger, 2016).
CalEnviroScreen is a mapping tool that measures 21 environmental and socioeconomic
indicators to produce pollution scores for each census tract in the state, allowing specific
communities to be identified as disadvantaged and in need of climate investments (Cushing et
al., 2018). AB 1550 in 2016 went even further, requiring that 25% of revenue from cap-and-trade
must be directed to projects located in these disadvantaged communities (Bigger, 2016). These
investments reflect the growing call for environmental justice communities to gain some value
from a program that continues pollution in their neighborhoods. In recent years, increased
funding led to the creation of the Low-Income Weatherization Program, the Transformative
Climate Communities Program, and utility debt relief, which each provide crucial recovery and
resilience aid to disadvantaged communities throughout California (Bigger, 2016).
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California Air Resources Board
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) was established in 1967 as a department
within the California Environmental Protection Agency to maintain healthy air quality and help
the state comply with air pollution regulations. CARB developed cap-and-trade and its
regulatory components based on a long process, weighing science and policy considerations to
create a cap-and-trade program that meaningfully contributed to California’s emissions reduction
goals and created an economic value for conserving forests. CARB has created a Climate
Change Scoping Plan every five years since 2008 in order to assess the progress of maximizing
feasible and cost-effective emissions reductions to reach the state’s 2030 climate goals (Zabin,
2020).
CARB established the Offset Protocol Task Force in 2019 to provide guidance on how to
ensure new offset protocols for cap-and-trade would provide direct environmental benefits to the
state and prioritize disadvantaged communities, Indigenous tribes, and rural communities
(Halper, 2021). On February 24, 2021, the environmental justice and environmental advocacy
members of the task force resigned, criticizing CARB for improperly handling conflicts of
interest for the majority of task force members who have financial interest in an expanded and
deregulated offset program (Tangri & Nowicki, 2021). They cited longstanding leniency to
demands from industry representatives and lobbyists, which successfully pressured CARB to
allow 8% of emissions reductions to come from offsets, up from the proposal of 4%, in the
original design of cap-and-trade (Bigger, 2016). Tangri and Nowicki argued that the program
needed to be reduced and refocused to address the needs of the state’s most impacted
communities, yet the task force recommended an expansion of the role of offsets, including
removing existing safeguards (Tangri & Nowicki, 2021).
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By the end of 2022, CARB will complete a new five year scoping plan. The state’s
current climate goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030,
and CARB estimates that cap-and-trade should represent more than a third of those reductions
(Anderson, Field and Mach, 2017). In January 2022, Assembly Speaker Anthony Rendon
expressed concern that cap-and-trade will not be able to provide the emissions reductions
required for California’s 2030 climate goal, stating that California is not on track to meet that
goal (Olney, 2022). California’s Secretary for Environmental Protection Jared Blumenfeld, who
oversees the scoping plan alongside CARB Chair Liane Randolph, said that the scoping plan will
specifically examine how much California’s strategy to meet its climate goals can rely on
cap-and-trade (Becker, 2021).
Forest offsets and carbon markets can be powerful tools for decreasing carbon emissions
on a drawn out time-scale if they accurately represent net emissions reductions. California’s
cap-and-trade program’s current reliance on forest offsets is derailing California’s progress
towards meeting its climate goals. At best, the inclusion of forest offsets helps companies
transition into a low-carbon economy that relies on significantly reduced emissions. In
California, the flaws in the system of offsets include systematic over-counting of carbon credits,
the exploitation of loopholes by landowners, out-dated insurance calculations, and continued
environmental injustice. These offset flaws have created a program that will prevent California
from meeting its greenhouse gas reduction goals by 2030.

9

II.

Systematic Over-Counting of Carbon Credits Due to Regional Averages
For the forest offsets program to help California meet its emissions reduction goals, all

carbon credits granted to projects must represent real carbon sequestration that directly matches
the amount of carbon that will be released when companies buy the credits. The current trend of
over-crediting forest offset projects threatens the guarantee that emissions released by polluters
are matched by emissions stored in forests.
The determination of carbon credits for a project in California’s offset program is based
upon regional averages of carbon storage in forests. The data come from the U.S. Forest Service.
Forest offset projects are granted credits when the area’s carbon storage is greater than the
regional average of carbon storage (Gifford, 2018). Landowners calculate a baseline scenario for
a project to represent the carbon storage in their trees. This determination is based on the type of
trees and the fact that they are preserved rather than logged. Project proposals include a predicted
business-as-usual logging scenario, which calculates stored carbon based on what would have
been destroyed without the project. Often, landowners submit logging scenarios that are close to
the regional average in order to maximize carbon credits they can earn by pledging to prevent
logging. Over 90% of projects in the forest offset program identify logging scenarios that are
within 5% of the regional average, the legal minimum scenario they can submit (Badgley et al.,
2021). It is unlikely that each project would be logged this much, which means that many of the
credits granted to projects based on these logging scenarios do not represent real emissions
reductions.
In an analysis of 102 million carbon credits from forest offsets, which is 65% of the
forest offset credits in California’s cap-and-trade program, 29% of credits were over-credited
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(Badgley et al., 2021). These 30 million tons of carbon worth $410 million did not represent
meaningful offsets to real carbon emissions.

Taking Advantage of Regional Borders
Researchers identified a pattern of projects along the borders of regions in California,
which each have distinct regional averages of carbon storage. Forests near both sides of a
regional border often have similar amounts of stored carbon. But the two regions have different
regional averages, so forest land on each side could produce different amounts of carbon credits
solely based on which side of the border it lies.
One example occurs in Northern California. There is a coastal region, with a regional
average of 205 tons of carbon per acre, and an inland region, with a regional average of 122 tons
of carbon per acre (Figure 1) ( Song & Temple, 2021a). Yellow dots–signifying projects near the
border that are prone to over-crediting–make up a majority of the projects within this region
(Figure 1). The projects are in the inland region, but close to the border of the coastal region,
because they can earn far more credits for the same tree species due to a lower regional average
of carbon storage in the inland region. In one instance, a project would earn $0 in the coastal
region, but instead it earned over $8 million just miles away in the inland region (Song &
Temple, 2021a). This $8 million represents carbon credits that polluters can purchase and use,
but it does not represent robust emissions reductions to match the corresponding emission output.
Within the inland region, borders between the three subregions can also cause variations
in carbon crediting. Projects are clustered within the darkest green subregion because it contains
the trees with the most carbon storage, but the regional average for the region is based upon the
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average of all three subregions (Badgley et al., 2021). These projects are eligible for more
upfront credits solely as a result of belonging to the same region as lower-carbon storage areas.

Figure 1. Maps of the Coastal and Inland regions, measuring the regional averages of carbon storage, including forest offset projects analyzed by
CarbonPlan researchers (Song & Temple, 2021a).

Another case of placing projects strategically near borders to maximize carbon credits,
despite no additional carbon reductions, takes place in projects managed by the Yurok Tribe and
offsets developer New Forests in Northern California. The tribe owns several offset projects on
their reservation of 65,000 acres surrounding the Klamath River (Kormann, 2018). Most of the
tribe’s land falls within the coastal region, but their reservation crosses the border between the
coastal and inland regions (Figure 2). Nevertheless, 99% of the tribe’s first forest offset project
falls within the inland region, where it is eligible for more credits despite nearly identical
vegetation, according to the tribe’s former forestry director (Song & Temple, 2021a).

Figure 2. Map of the Yurok Reservation in Northern California, including the location of the lands they enrolled to receive forest offsets (Song &
Temple, 2021a).
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Offsets Saved in Allowances
A problem with the widespread over-crediting of forest offsets is the ability of
carbon-emitting companies to save carbon offset credits as allowances. Companies currently
have 322 million carbon credits saved as allowances. Experts from the Independent Emissions
Market Advisory Committee warn that these credits could undercut the cap-and-trade program’s
ability to reduce emissions (Cullenward et al., 2019). While the program’s total emissions cap
continues to fall year after year, companies could use banked allowances to limit their obligation
to decrease direct emissions (Green, 2017).
California is updating its Climate Change Scoping Plan, and the performance of offsets
within the cap-and-trade program is a major topic of discussion. Ross Brown, the Principal Fiscal
& Policy Analyst for the Environmental division of the California Legislative Analyst’s Office,
warns that “it’s possible that when you get out into the later years up to 2030, that large bank of
allowances could be used to comply with the program. And as a result, the state might not be
close to its ambitious emission targets out to 2030” (Becker, 2021). By 2030, the state must
reduce emissions by at least 40% below 1990 levels, which will require cutting emissions by
about 4% each year (Haya et al., 2020). In contrast, California reached its 2020 emissions target
in 2016, but was only reducing emissions by about 1% each year (Becker, 2021).
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III.

Additionality in Offset Crediting - Loopholes for Landowners
The current loopholes in forest offset protocol allow landowners to submit projects to

receive forest offsets that do not represent an increase in the amount of carbon being stored in the
included trees. Projects are located around the country, making it harder for state regulators to
oversee projects that might take advantage of a lack of data or that their trees are already
conserved before earning credits. Similar to over-crediting, if these projects do not represent real
emissions reductions, they harm California’s progress towards reducing statewide emissions.
The concept of additionality deals with the effects of carbon offsets. It measures whether
the incentive of the carbon market creates additional emissions reductions by protecting forests.
The baseline scenario for any given project is intended to show what would happen to a forest if
the forest project were not initiated, and thus the maintenance of carbon storage is additional as a
result of the forest offset project’s approval. But in measuring this additionality to award carbon
credits to projects, carbon accounting is a deeply subjective and uneven technical process that
can be open to interpretation (Gifford, 2020). Problems with the location and type of landowner
for specific forest offset projects have called into question the precision with which California’s
cap-and-trade program can accurately provide measured emissions reductions.
In March 2012, Our Children’s Earth Foundation and the Citizens’ Climate Lobby sued
the California Air Resources Board, questioning its process for evaluating additionality of offsets
within California’s cap-and-trade program (Kaswan, 2014). The San Francisco Superior Court
emphasized the importance of ensuring accurate additionality, noting that non-additional offsets
would “undercut the cap-and-trade program because they substitute illusory reductions, those
that would have occurred anyway, for real reductions that the capped sources should have
undertaken” (Kaswan, 2014). As CARB and many researchers point out, it is hard to quantify
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additionality and measure whether a forest could be logged to any certain level within the next
100 years. The Superior Court determined that its role was not to prefer one method for
calculating additionality, deferring to CARB’s expertise and thorough process (Kaswan, 2014).
The Court of Appeal upheld this ruling (Our Children’s Earth Foundation v. California Air
Resources Board, Climate Action Reserve, 2015). CARB has used this ruling, and the subsequent
upholding of it by the California Court of Appeal, as reason to disregard criticisms of their
process for evaluating additionality in forest offset projects (Halper, 2021). Nevertheless,
projects based outside of California and those proposed by conservation groups raise questions
about the calculation of additional offsets, and whether such projects pose problems to the
success of cap-and-trade at reaching its planned emissions reductions.

Projects Outside of California
Currently, forest offsets projects exist in 22 states in California’s cap-and-trade program
(Figure 3), with the largest source being Alaska with $500 million worth of carbon credits sold to
date (Halper, 2021). Environmental activists have criticized the large number of offsets far away
in southern Alaska and the Northeast, because hypothetical emissions reductions there will not
make a direct difference to those living with fossil fuel refineries in their neighborhoods.
Cap-and-trade is a program that aims to reduce global emissions, but Californians are paying the
cost of in-state pollution without receiving the benefits from out-of-state forest conservation.

Figure 3. Map of analyzed carbon credits across the United States and southern Alaska based on public data for California’s forest offset program
(Badgley et al., 2021)
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Outside of California, it is harder for state regulators to rely on the integrity of federal
and state data necessary to calculate carbon storage and measure emissions reductions in offset
projects. These challenges make it easier for landowners to exploit loopholes in the system and
gain carbon credits that do not reflect emissions reductions. One project of concern is located in
New Mexico, managed by the Mescalero Apache Tribe and offsets developer Forest Carbon
Partners. The project earned 3.7 million credits worth over $50 million as a result of the absence
of U.S. Forest Service Data that calculated the area’s regional average of carbon storage as zero
(Song & Temple, 2021a). This error was originally discovered and acknowledged by CARB in
2014, yet in 2015 the developer could file the project consisting of 220,000 acres that earned
carbon credits based on the existing regional average (Song & Temple, 2021a). Just two weeks
after the project was filed, CARB updated the regional average of the area, which would have
eliminated nearly every carbon credit earned by the project (Song & Temple, 2021a). Despite
these facts, CARB reaffirmed that it believes these carbon credits earned by the out-of-state
landowners represent real, quantifiable carbon emissions reductions, despite the credits being
rewarded primarily due to a lack of data in New Mexico (California Air Resources Board, 2021).
One recent proposal by CARB could limit the number of out-of-state projects available
for the cap-and-trade program. Since 2021, CARB requires that half of all offsets projects
provide direct environmental benefits to California (Cushing et al., 2018). While this limit could
potentially address concerns that the environmental benefits are too far away to be realized by
the state’s residents, this will also likely cause increased demand for California projects and
decrease the available projects for selection. Over 50% of California’s forests are federal lands,
which are currently ineligible for the program, so developers will likely have to push into
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increasingly fire-prone areas to find projects to continue generating forest offsets (Kormann,
2018).

Conservation Groups as Landowners
Conservation nonprofits often propose land they own to be eligible for carbon credits. Of
all forest offset projects approved for California’s cap-and-trade program, 26% are in forests
managed by conservation nonprofits (Anderson et al., 2017). In order to earn credits for their
project, these nonprofits must submit a baseline scenario in which they log the land under a
business-as-usual plan. Leading conservation organizations such as the Nature Conservancy and
Massachusetts Audubon Society (Mass Audubon) frequently present scenarios in which they
would heavily log thousands of acres of land, despite historically preserving those same forests.
These types of projects can threaten the integrity of measurable emissions reductions because
credits are meant to represent new emissions reductions to cancel out new pollution.
In 2015, CARB approved a Mass Audubon forest offsets project worth 600,000 credits
and $6 million for forest land in western Massachusetts that the organization has maintained as a
wildlife habitat for decades (Song & Temple, 2021b). CARB sets a floor for logging proposals
based on how the average landowners logs their forests, and Mass Audubon submitted a logging
proposal that was just 0.2% above this floor (Song & Temple, 2021b). The additionality of
offsets awarded to nonprofits such as Mass Audubon are questionable given their longstanding
history of preserving their forests and nature preserves. If projects do not represent the claimed
level of reductions in carbon emissions, the carbon credits they earn are likely not representative
of real emissions reductions. If carbon credits pay landowners to continue managing land in the
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same way they were before, the magnitude of the nation’s carbon sink will not increase as
intended (Halper, 2021).
The Nature Conservancy spends about $150 million purchasing land every year and
proposed several of these lands for forest offset projects to sell to corporations like JPMorgan,
Disney, and Blackrock (Elgin, 2020). Corporations use these offsets to meet self-imposed
sustainability goals and actively promote their role as environmental stewards. Similar to the
land owned by Mass Audubon, it is questionable whether the offsets they are buying from Nature
Conservancy represent additional emissions reductions. The Hawk Mountain Sanctuary, in
partnership with the Nature Conservancy, applied for a forest offsets project for their lands in
Eastern Pennsylvania. The custodians of the land were approved and used the money for taking
better care of the land and implementing improved forest management projects (Elgin, 2020).
Laurie Goodrich, the Sanctuary’s director of conservation science, believed that carbon credits
were generated from their forestry improvements, but the Sanctuary’s application reveals that a
majority of the credits were granted based on a scenario of heavy logging (Elgin, 2020).
Nevertheless, the forest was untouched for over 85 years, and Goodrich said “we’d still be
managing the land the same way” with or without the carbon credits (Elgin, 2020). Proposals
like this have been replicated by conservation nonprofits around the United States to earn credits
in California’s carbon market. In a study analyzing whether the projects initiated by conservation
nonprofits recorded actual additionality of carbon emissions, researchers concluded that “while
the state program may provide funds to these groups that could help them acquire new land, it’s
not likely that the offsets were changing practices in the forests they enrolled” (Kelly & Schmitz,
2016).
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Nature Conservancy and Mass Audubon both responded to criticism by reiterating their
commitment to a high standard of forest conservation that produces robust carbon emissions
reductions. The Nature Conservancy completed an internal review, finding room for
improvements in the way that they calculated logging scenarios for forest offset projects (The
Nature Conservancy, 2021). The organization stated that they believe conservation nonprofits are
uniquely equipped with the knowledge and resources to operate within carbon markets, but they
are committed to engaging with improvements to forest offset program methodology. Mass
Audubon similarly agreed that there are challenges to designing a program that accurately
calculates carbon sequestration, but they see carbon markets as a necessary part of the solution to
decreasing global emissions (O’Connor, 2021).
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IV.

Risk and Insurance in Forest Offsets
To account for the risks of long-term carbon storage, forest offsets protocols require that a

portion of carbon credits are set aside for insurance in case of tree damage. The insurance
requirements have not changed since the program’s design, despite forests facing elevated risks
including greater frequency and intensity of wildfires. The insurance does not alter emissions
released, as companies are free to pollute after purchasing offset credits. If the insurance system
were to fail to accurately cover tree destruction, net emissions would increase and offsets would
threaten California’s emission reduction goals.
To gain approval for carbon offsets, a project must guarantee that the carbon storage in
the forests be protected for 100 years to ensure that the offset carbon emissions are meaningfully
absorbed from the atmosphere. If the project is damaged by wildfires, illegal logging, disease, or
pests, the stored carbon will be released, but the fossil fuel company will have already emitted
carbon dioxide. This scenario presents a potential problem for the validity of the carbon offset
program in reaching emissions reductions, especially given the increasing prevalence of wildfires
and tree disease throughout California. CARB’s solution to these risks of carbon release in offset
projects exists in the form of a buffer pool, in which project owners contribute a set percentage
of their carbon credits as an insurance policy for the potential destruction of some emissions
reductions (Pontecorvo & Osaka, 2021).

Elevated Wildfire Risk
Offsets projects in California, all located in the Northern region of the state, are prone to
wildfire risk. The three largest fires in California history, all in the past four years, occurred in
the same regions as these projects, and scientists forecast additional increases in wildfire
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intensity and frequency in the coming years as a result of climate change (California Department
of Forestry and Fire Protection, 2022). Model projections of future fires in California found that
the total area burned could increase by over 25% by 2040 (Gutierrez et al., 2021). The increasing
risk of wildfires in regions with high concentrations of offset projects threatens the success of
carbon credits at canceling out companies’ emissions.
Eddie Ranch, located in Mendocino County, was approved in late 2018 as a carbon offset
project, just months after a fire burned through the property (Halper, 2021). CARB approved the
project based on the condition of the ranch before the fire, earning the project 270,000 carbon
credits. The wildfire invalidated a significant portion of these credits, yet PBF Energy purchased
the entirety of the credits from these projects and used them to continue polluting at refineries in
Torrance and Martinez, California (Halper, 2021). To account for the lost carbon absorption due
to a largely-burned forest, CARB backfilled offsets by withdrawing extras from the state’s
insurance fund–the buffer pool. Project owners must contribute a set percentage of credits based
on inherent risks in their project, but these rates were set in 2008 when climate and wildfire
conditions, especially in California, were vastly different (Pontecorvo & Osaka, 2021). These
rates can vary depending on the location and risk of a given project, but only slightly. For
wildfire risk, owners must contribute between two and four percent of their total carbon credits
to the buffer pool, but this small range is identical whether the forest is in wildfire-prone
Northern California or in less combustible locations in the United States (Anderegg et al., 2020).
Over 250,000 acres in the Colville Reservation in Northern Washington burned in
wildfires in 2020 and 2021, just five years after the Colville Tribe sold $80 million worth of
carbon credits to BP from their forest offset project (Pontecorvo & Osaka, 2021). While these
lost offsets can be covered by offsets stored in the buffer pool, the looming threat of increasing
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wildfires could bankrupt the insurance plan, resulting in a significant loss of carbon storage
meant to offset the persisting carbon emissions from fossil fuel companies in California. The
uncertainty of trading a known amount of emissions with an unknown amount of emissions
reductions threatens the integrity of California’s climate goals (Pontecorvo & Osaka, 2021).

The Carbon Credit Buffer Pool
By not selling a percentage of their carbon credits, project owners contribute credits to
California’s buffer pool as insurance for the destruction of forests before the 100 years of
preservation is up. Based on the varying risk factors of a given project, landowners might
contribute anywhere between 11 and 20 percent of their carbon credits into the buffer pool, but
these rates lacked rigorous analysis when they were decided in 2008, and many factors affecting
these risks have changed in the 14 years since (Anderegg et al., 2020). Though it may
undercount heightened risks forests face, the forest offsets program accounts for risks that carbon
storage projects face. Fossil fuel companies, however, face zero risk in the scenario because their
license to pollute does not change, no matter what happens to the trees meant to counteract their
emissions. Essentially, the buffer pool is an insurance policy for the capital investment, but not
the sequestered carbon in the trees (Gifford, 2020). The buffer pool ensures that the financial
credits bought by fossil fuel companies remain and carbon sequestration occurs in other trees on
the project site, but fails to account for the release of carbon that takes place when trees are
burned or destroyed.
One potential fix for adapting to changing fire risk in forest offset projects is to include
the fire regime condition within the market value of a carbon credit. By attaching the financial
investment made in forest offsets to fire risk, this solution would place less value on forests that
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face an increasing likelihood of wildfire destruction. Under this proposal, a unit of carbon in a
fire-prone forest is worth less than a unit of carbon in a forest more resistant to fires, and thus
more likely to sequester the carbon for the full 100 years (Hurteau et al., 2009). This change
would gradually shift the market of forest offsets towards projects with lower disturbance risk,
providing more assurance that the buffer pool would be able to account for lost carbon
sequestration.
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V.

Environmental Justice vs. Conservation
Carbon offsets allow fossil fuel companies to emit carbon in communities with large

populations of people of color across California with the goal that the emissions will be canceled
out via carbon sequestration in a forest offset project elsewhere. The program, widely used by
environmentalists such as conservation groups and Indigenous communities, pits the ideals of
forest conservation against direct emissions reductions in environmental justice communities.
The draws of financial compensation for forest compensation create an entrenched offset system
that incentivizes environmental groups to support an expanded offset program rather than lobby
regulators to establish more rigorous standards for carbon credits. It is politically challenging to
address the system’s negative impacts on California’s emissions reduction goals when
environmental justice activists and conservation groups are on opposing sides.
The history of the offsets program, and cap-and-trade more broadly, has been a constant
battle between environmental justice groups and the CARB regulators. When Neil Tangri and
Brian Nowicki resigned from the Offsets Protocol Task Force in 2021, they criticized CARB for
listening almost entirely to the voices of the industry players who stood to benefit from a greatly
expanded carbon offset program, sidelining the voices of the collective environmental justice
movement seeking accountability and direct emissions reductions (Tangri & Nowicki, 2021).
Although the Task Force’s goal was to identify ways to make the program better serve
Indigenous and environmental justice communities, it ultimately strengthened financial
incentives for conservation groups and Indigenous tribes to want an expanded forest offset
program, despite its flaws (Halper, 2021).
Specifically, environmental justice organizers believe the program is delaying promised
results. Alicia Rivera, who works with Communities for a Better Environment in Wilmington,
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pointed out that her community has had plenty of time experiencing cap-and-trade to see that it is
not working at reducing emissions at nearby refineries (Halper, 2021). Cap-and-trade has existed
for seven years, yet community members in refinery neighborhoods have failed to see direct and
immediate reductions to local sources of emissions, which is ultimately a goal of the program. In
the first several years of cap-and-trade, 52% of California facilities regulated by cap-and-trade
actually increased their emissions (Cushing et al., 2018). During this same period, companies
used offsets to emit four times more carbon than the targeted emissions reduction cap-and-trade
was meant to allow. Compared to communities that experienced emissions reductions during the
first years of cap-and-trade, communities with increased emissions had higher proportions of
people of color, lower incomes, and less educational achievement (Cushing et al., 2018). For the
climate and the state’s program, all emissions reductions are treated as equal. But disadvantaged
communities in California incur the highest costs and delayed emissions reductions in an offsets
program that does not account for historical environmental injustices.

Indigenous Tribe Projects
The Yurok tribe has earned tens of millions from carbon credits and purchased almost
60,000 acres of land that it now protects and restores through forest offset projects (Song &
Temple, 2021a). Not every tribe member is satisfied with the decision to enroll their lands in
forest offsets projects. Jene McCovey, a tribal elder, said “I think we did a good thing by saving
the trees, but I’m not happy with it. It’s not viable. It allows polluters to pollute” (Kormann,
2018). This echoes a frequent criticism of forest offsets, in that there are inherent climate benefits
in preserving forests, but when the money for conservation is directly tied to corporations
continuing to pollute frontline communities, it is hard to view the program as an authentic
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climate solution. Marty Lamebear, member of the Yurok Tribe Forestry Program’s fire
department, expressed a similar sentiment, “we’re selling [carbon credits] to these big industries
so they can keep doing what they do. They buy our air, so they can, you know, pollute theirs”
(Kormann, 2018).
Still, Indigenous communities see value in creating an economic value for forests besides
logging. Ed Mann is the Yurok tribe’s forestry director and he sees immense value in providing
tribes a way to earn income to protect forests and purchase additional land for conservation.
Tribes are restoring old-growth forests, creating wildlife sanctuaries, and carrying out the
traditional practice of prescribed burning to reduce likelihood of wildfires (Kormann, 2018).
Cody Desautel, president of the Intertribal Timber Council, sees offset projects as necessary
because forests are not often maintained if there is no value associated with owning forest land
(Song & Temple, 2021a). The Rights and Resources Initiative found massive benefits to
returning land to Indigenous communities, as forests under their management store millions of
tons of carbon worldwide (Sirica, Bautista and Kalliongis, 2018).

Equity in Governance
In order to create an equitable system of governance within CARB’s regulation of forest
offsets, the decision makers must reflect those affected most by the cap-and-trade program
outcomes. In his resignation letter from the Compliance Offsets Task Force, state climate policy
director for the Center for Biological Diversity Brian Nowicki called out that the majority of the
members on the Task Force stood to benefit financially from an expanded offset program (Tangri
& Nowicki, 2021). The Task Force position was unpaid, meaning that project developers
corporations could pay their staff to dedicate hours to this work, while environmental justice and
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Indigenous communities, the intended beneficiaries, did not have the resources for this. This
arrangement kept the two environmental community advocates on the sidelines of key
discussions, while industry representatives influenced reform discussions to prioritize expanding
the offsets program. Environmental justice groups ultimately lack influence with market
administrators, leaving the implementation of market instruments without a justice and equity
lens. Systems such as cap-and-trade and forest offsets break down nature into measurable and
quantifiable components, and the financial mechanisms in play strictly protect the components
involved in generating income (Finley-Brook, 2017). Although cap-and-trade was meant to make
polluters pay because a price on carbon would drive down emissions, it instead became a market
that allowed companies to pay to continue polluting (Bigger, 2016).
The current carbon market maintains a financial reliance on polluters, meaning
communities rely on continued pollution to receive the funds from offset credits. Instead,
communities need a solution that provides a steady stream of revenue independent of fossil fuel
use. This year, Assemblymember Isaac Bryan introduced the California Justice40 Act, which
would require a minimum of 40% of federal climate and infrastructure funds provide direct
benefits to “low-income, Indigenous, and rural communities and communities of color” (Nguyen
& Shaikh, 2022). California will receive $45.5 billion over the next five years due to the passage
of the federal Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and Justice40 ensures that funding is
directed towards communities that are on the frontline of the climate crisis (Nguyen & Shaikh,
2022). This proposal will end disadvantaged communities’ reliance on investments and funding
that are a direct result of continued carbon emissions.

27

VI.

Implications
Forest offsets, included in California’s cap-and-trade program to deliver net-neutral

conditions that ease companies’ transition to reduced emissions over time, have failed to deliver
on the goals they were intended to achieve. Offsets were meant to provide incentives for
landowners to change their land use management practices, but instead the flaws in
implementation have led to shortcuts and loopholes. Instead of strengthening California’s
cap-and-trade program, forest offsets water down the ambition of emissions reduction goals by
failing to represent necessary, real, and robust emissions reductions (Victor & Cullenward,
2020). In order to reach the state’s 2030 climate goal, California lawmakers and regulators must
equitably address the inherent problems that forest offsets pose to meaningful emissions
reductions. In the development of its 2022 scoping plan, CARB can keep California on track as a
global climate leader by excluding offsets from the future of cap-and-trade and being
accountable to the disadvantaged communities that bear the greatest costs from continued fossil
fuel production under the current offset system.
Nine years into the cap-and-trade program, it is important to determine whether forest
offsets are delivering the promised climate mitigation necessary to confirm their legitimacy as a
policy mechanism. States such as Oregon and Washington are currently developing
cap-and-trade programs that mirror California’s, and it is crucial that flaws are identified and
avoided in any jurisdiction that adopts California’s model.
Alternatively, California can make polluters pay more and use this money to fund forest
protection instead of tying community investments to profits from selling forest offsets. The
carbon market has created a financial reliance on polluters, meaning that communities rely on the
pay to pollute model to receive funding for crucial projects and investments in climate resiliency
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(Callahan et al., 2021). This arrangement creates challenges for lawmakers and state agencies to
build long term budgets for climate programs because the annual revenue from allowance
auctions in cap-and-trade is uncertain and reliant on continued emissions. If the forest offset
program were to be altered or removed, the stream of revenue for these programs might shrink.
The California Justice40 Act could fill this funding gap by directing 40% of federal climate
investments to disadvantaged communities, providing a constant stream of revenue for
communities who bear the costs of continued emissions by polluters (Callahan et al., 2021).
If CARB maintains forest offsets as a central component of California’s cap-and-trade
program, the price of carbon credits should be increased via a higher price floor. In 2020, carbon
credits from offsets sold for $13.67 per ton to polluters (Badgley et al., 2021). The United States
Government Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon estimates that the current
social cost of carbon is $51 per ton, and will be at least $79 per ton by 2030 (Schatzki & Stavins,
2018). The low price of carbon offsets, relative to the social cost of carbon, ensures that polluters
are able to pay less than they should be charged to continue polluting.
This problem also affects the type of forest offset projects selected for California’s
cap-and-trade program. Companies are encouraged to buy the cheapest offsets, which are often
the lowest quality and less likely to represent real emissions reductions (Victor & Cullenward,
2020). This system of selling offset credits keeps companies in a race to the bottom because
developers will always seek out projects that generate the most credits, which most often exploit
the flaws in the program and have questionable climate benefits. This low offset price does not
include key factors that affect emissions reductions, such as the length of carbon storage, the risk
of forest destruction, or social equity concerns (Joppa et al., 2021). The CEO of Lyme Timber, a
top participant in California’s forest offset program that has earned $53 million by selling carbon
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credits, proposed a new form of offsets projects that demonstrates real, measurable reductions in
timber harvesting in their forests (Elgin, 2022). By decreasing logging by 15% on a specific
project and guaranteeing increased carbon storage, he calculated that an offset that reflects the
lost profit from timber sales would need to cost at least $60 per ton. The current range of $10 to
$15 per offset is only enough to fund offsets projects that cut corners and exploit program flaws,
but is not enough to fund projects representing robust carbon sequestration (Victor &
Cullenward, 2020). In addition to implementing a price floor, CARB could also implement a
higher price of offsets for companies located in heavily-polluted, disadvantaged communities
across California (Cushing et al., 2018).
Even a perfect forest offset system, devoid of existing flaws and challenges, only delivers
net neutral benefits to the climate. Emissions produced are matched 1:1 with emissions
reductions through increased carbon sequestration in forests. Scientists are clear that we need to
rapidly decrease emissions to avoid catastrophic global temperature increases, and investing
significant time and energy into a solution that provides at best net neutral benefits will not get
our world to the emissions reductions needed. Additionally, anything less than a perfect forest
offsets program creates a net increase in carbon emissions. Polluters’ emissions are real and
quantifiable, while the emissions reductions will always be uncertain because of the subjectivity
of carbon accounting in determining offset worth.
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